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The 2016 United Nations General Assembly Special Session on the World Drug Problem: An opportunity to move towards metrics that measure outcomes that really matter

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In recent years, we have seen the emergence of an increasingly honest and sophisticated discourse surrounding the measurement of illicit drug markets. With this has come a growing acceptance among some governments and international organisations of the concept of uncertainty; an inherent characteristic of our understanding of any illegal market. At the UN level, for example, this is reflected in the use of data ranges rather than specific point figures for drug use prevalence and associated variables within the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime's (UNODC) flagship annual publication, the *World Drug Report* (WDR). The WDR also now openly contains the admission that there are enormous data gaps in certain regions, particularly in Asia and Africa. Both of these parts of the world possess expanding populations and accelerating rates of urbanization, phenomena associated with increasing levels of the illicit use of a range of psychoactive substances. As such, although sometimes relying on extrapolation and expert opinion for some sense of 'ground truth', out-of-date and incomplete figures are omitted from some regional and sub-regional assessments of prevalence rates. The result is a more candid, if still inherently problematic, attempt to offer an overview of aspects of a complex and increasingly fluid illicit market.

While this is the case, within discussion of the effectiveness of drug control policy at various levels of governance, there remains a remarkable faith in and dominance of certain quantitative data³ to back up claims that authorities are pursuing what are deemed to be successful counter drug strategies. A growing appreciation of the problems associated with measuring an increasingly complex and fluid illicit market has not been accompanied by a systemic appreciation that measurements of success might be focusing on the wrong things.

Such misdirected assessments take place within a conceptual framework ingrained in what can be usefully called the global drug prohibition regime; an almost universally accepted treaty-based system currently built on a suite of three UN treaties. Dating back to the first decades of the twentieth century and in its current form the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the existing regime has dual overarching aims: to ensure an adequate supply of pharmaceuticals for the licit market - particularly essential medicines - and at the same time prevent the non-scientific and non-medical production, supply and use of narcotic and psychotropic substances. With this in mind, the system has been developed on the basis of two interconnected tenets. First, a deeply held belief that the best way to reduce what has become known simply as the 'world drug problem' is to minimize the scale of - and

ultimately eliminate - the illicit market and second, that this can be achieved through a reliance on prohibition oriented and supply-side dominated measures.

Since the 1960s, such measures have relied predominantly on the activities of law enforcement agencies, and in some parts of the world, the military. On the supply-side the traditional and until relatively widely accepted logic of this zero-tolerance 'war on drugs' approach has been that success in disrupting and ultimately halting the illicit production, manufacture and distribution of drugs listed in the conventions will reduce their availability to actual and potential consumers. Furthermore, although the regime makes some provision for drug prevention, treatment and rehabilitation, demand reduction has been long driven by a belief that the widespread arrest of drug users and the punitive punishment of individuals caught with drugs will reduce the scale of the market by coercing current users to change their behaviour and by deterring potential users from engaging in proscribed activity in the first place.

With such ideas underpinning the operation of the regime, much attention has unsurprisingly been given to metrics with a narrow focus on arrests and prosecutions (drug dealers, traffickers and in some cases drug users), seizures (unprocessed and processed drugs including opium, coca, cannabis, cocaine, heroin, amphetamine type stimulants and precursor chemicals required for manufacture), in traditional producer states like Colombia and Afghanistan, hectares of drug crops eradicated (cannabis, opium poppy and coca) and increasingly in various parts of the world, drug processing laboratories destroyed. Along with the scale and patterns of drug use, many of these data sets are given prominence in the WDR as well as regional and national equivalents. As with other aspects of the market, the quality of data here is also patchy and variable due to the resource intensive processes involved in their capture, but this is the general picture. As any observer of sessions of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND), the UN's Vienna based central policy-making body on drugs, will attest, country statements frequently comprise little more than long lists of achievements against these supposed indicators of policy success. One visible manifestation of the current regime's bias is the number of national delegations to the CND comprising almost entirely of representatives from law enforcement and criminal justice departments within their governments, many of them resplendent in dress uniforms and shoulder pips.

The Functionality and Limitations of Current Metrics

Beyond the directional influence of the regime in sustaining the use of these metrics in measuring policy success, it is plausible to suggest that the current foci of measurement are politically attractive to both governments and some international agencies because they add a much needed degree of simplicity and certainty to what is being increasingly understood to be an uncertain market environment. Figures concerning seizures, arrests and hectares eradicated provide relatively stable islands of numeric confidence within a sea of statistical inexactitude. Moreover, they are valuable in terms of media management and providing the populace of countries, in many cases voters and tax payers, with what is presented as evidence that authorities are achieving some success in their on-going and costly – both in terms of resource and in some cases lives – efforts to 'solve' the drug problem. In this regard, recall media friendly events and photo opportunities involving neatly arranged bales of cannabis, blocks of heroin and cocaine and bags of pills, often flanked by police officers or soldiers and pleased looking senior officials. Additionally, at the operational level, particularly with regard to law enforcement agencies, such metrics can be important in terms of targets and a range of Key Performance Indicators.⁴ In this way, at both the regime level and the operational level beneath it, the current metrics do much to reinforce assumptions and behaviour, and further embed policy priorities.

It must be said that in some instances an emphasis on indicators is also a characteristic of a positive shift towards policy evaluation, which is part of any good five-phase policy process including agenda setting, formulation, decision-making, implementation and evaluation. A useful example of this can be found within the European Union Drugs Action Plan 2013-2016. This relatively recent document was, mindful of the EU's strong association with the UN treaty system, developed in line with the regime's core principles. Among other things, the Action Plan includes a range of supply reduction indicators, including drug price and purity.⁵ These variables can be useful when trying to understand the state of the market and by implication the effectiveness, or indeed ineffectiveness, of policy and associated law enforcement action. Increases in price and reductions in purity can be seen in some ways as evidence of successful policies and law enforcement interventions. However, as with other guidance and strategy documents,

there is a need to interrogate exactly what the Action Plan's indicators in other areas, particularly those relating to arrests and seizures, really tell us.⁶

It is true that they may be useful for understanding and analysing market trends, including changing trafficking routes, the different drug trafficking organisations involved in the trade (through the analysis of packaging and smuggling techniques) and patterns of drug use. Yet, as with figures relating to drug crop eradication or the number of drug laboratories destroyed in other parts of the world and presented within the WDR and other reports, in reality these are process indicators of law enforcement operational activity. Such activity might be completely independent of the true scale and nature of the market and have more to do with budgetary and personnel considerations and even political imperatives. Measures of operational activity therefore have limited utility in terms of measuring policy effectiveness.⁷

While such measurements of process continue to be privileged in multinational policy debates, there is a growing realization in some quarters that these traditional, and relatively simplistic, indicators are increasingly inadequate and, in driving resources towards the wrong activities, potentially damaging. This is particularly so as we begin to understand more about the dynamic and resilient nature of markets and how they are affected by policies and interventions. Evidence from over fifty years of enforcement dominated drug policy has revealed few sustained and geographically widespread successes. Far from being reduced in scale and then eliminated, drug markets have survived the attention of law enforcement agencies and, in places like Latin America, the military, through adaptation. These adapted markets often cause more social harm, and in wider geographical areas, than the original markets that were subject to enforcement action.⁸ Moreover, an increasing preoccupation with elimination of the illicit market and an obsession with preventing diversion of licit drugs for recreational purposes has done much to limit access to essential medicines in some parts of the world, particularly Africa.

Despite this 'whack a mole' situation where 'successes' in one place are offset by transformations in the market - and the subordination of one of the regimes core objectives regarding access to drugs for medical purposes - consensus statements negotiated at the UN level still implicitly frame the multinational approach in terms of solving the 'world drug problem'. Each building upon the thrust of earlier pieces of international soft law, significant documents as recent as the 2009 Political Declaration on drugs not only pledged the international community to 'eliminate or reduce significantly' illicit drug production and demand, drug-related health and social harms and drug related money laundering, it also set a date by which the goal should be achieved: 2019.⁹ Although a slight move away from the quixotic slogan, and the thinking that underpinned it, of the 1998 United Nations General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on Drugs, 'A Drug Free World. We Can Do it!' - in this instance by 2008 - there remain within the UN echoes of discussions of the expectations of the regime that date back to the 1960s; an era when the knowledge of both markets and the properties and harms associated with the consumption of a range of psychoactive substances was far less developed than today. For example, commenting on the passage of the Single Convention, in 1966 Herbert May, a grandee of the system, remarked that 'By now the problems have been clearly defined and some of them have been *solved*, or instruments of their *solution* have been created: non-medical consumption of opium, coca leaf and cannabis, and the drugs manufactured from them is outlawed in principle and is bound to disappear after transitional periods of adaptation....' (emphasis added).¹⁰ Such a view is very much at odds with current thinking within some states where the drug issue is seen far more as a 'wicked problem'. That is to say, a problem that is difficult or impossible to solve because of incomplete, contradictory and changing requirements.¹¹ As John Camillus succinctly put it in a 2008 edition of the *Harvard Business Review*, "'Wicked" problems can't be solved, but they can be tamed.'¹²

This change in perspective, objectives and a resultant shift in the policy landscape in some parts of the world are crucial to any discussion of drug policy metrics and their reform. Armed with a better understanding of drugs, drug markets and the limitations of enforcement oriented interventions, more and more nations, or jurisdictions within them, are moving away from a determination to simply eliminate the market (and viewing every seizure and arrest as a linear and positive step towards that goal), and shifting towards a market management approach that seeks to reduce a range of drug market related harms. Such a process has much to do with a growing appreciation of what were referred to by the Executive Director of the UNODC itself in 2008 as the 'unintended consequences' of the operation of the current regime. As the data presented in the WDR demonstrate, while perhaps stable and 'contained' - questionable claims bearing in mind the continuing high levels of data uncertainty in many parts of the world - the policies championed by the regime have not only failed to achieve a core high order objective of

eliminating the illicit drug market. Their pursuit has actually generated a range of what are akin to iatrogenic individual and societal harms that are in many ways often greater than those associated with markets for proscribed substances themselves. These include the creation of a criminal black market often characterised by high levels of violence and corruption, an emphasis on law enforcement interventions rather than those associated with health, processes of geographical and substance displacement and the marginalisation of drug users and small scale subsistence farmers involved in the production of drug crops.¹³ Within this context, and inevitably driven by specific 'local' imperatives including the financial costs associated with law enforcement dominated policies, increasing numbers of governments and authorities are engaging with approaches that include the decriminalisation or depenalisation of the possession of drugs, often cannabis but sometimes – as in Portugal - all controlled substances, for personal use, and health oriented harm reduction interventions that explicitly tolerate, and seek to manage the consequences of, illicit drug use. These include evidence based interventions like needle exchange programmes, opioid substitution therapy, and in some instances drug consumption rooms and controlled heroin prescription.¹⁴ And of course, within the United States of America and, at the national level, Uruguay, there have recently been shifts to establish legal regulated markets for recreational cannabis use.

The decision within Montevideo in 2012 owed much to concerns regarding drug related market violence. While few states are at the point where they wish to create legal markets to better deal with this problem, there is a growing appreciation that illicit drug markets are not inherently violent places. Rather, the level of violence is often a product of the type of law enforcement intervention deployed. With this in mind, the goal of reducing market violence is instructive in highlighting not only the increasing disconnect between new priorities and objectives at the national and sub-national level and the traditional indicators still dominating the multilateral scene, but also what might be seen as a metrics trap; the role of numbers in sustaining what are being increasingly regarded to be ineffective and counterproductive policies. How, for example, can authorities measure the success of an intervention aiming to reduce retail market violence when the established and narrow indicators only consider figures for arrests and seizures? Within this instance, moreover, the very act of making arrests and disrupting market structures through seizures may actually increase violence through 'turf wars' within and between retail organisations.¹⁵ Here healthy arrest and seizure figures might, therefore, be used to denote policy 'success', but they miss entirely consequential increases in violence and the negative impact on communities. Similar situations exist in relation to a range of health, development and security issues across a wide array of drug markets.

Appreciation of these sorts of dilemmas isn't entirely new. Various NGOs and academic research units, including the Global Commission on Drug Policy, have been flagging up, if not fully exploring, the issue for some time.¹⁶ Perhaps more significantly, some member states and agencies within the UN system itself have begun also to call for a reassessment of the current situation. At the 2015 session of the CND, both Ecuador and, notably, Colombia raised the issue of metrics within their national statements,¹⁷ while in June a report of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) included an explicit call for 'New metrics to evaluate drug control policies'.¹⁸ It is also worth noting that the UK government has been quietly developing an innovative framework for assessing policies to counter transnational organised crime.¹⁹ There is clearly a growing view that there should be a shift away from process indicators to measurement of the impact of drug markets (production, trafficking and consumption) and related policy responses on the security and health of citizens and the social and economic development of communities.

The Challenges of Developing New Metrics

It seems clear then that, in broad terms, drug policy effectiveness assessments should be involve moving away from the measurement of interventions, flows and scale, towards metrics that measure outcomes that really matter to individuals and communities. What is less clear, however, are the specifics of what to measure and how to measure them. This is clearly complex and far from value free. While often accompanied by a positivist premise, the development of objectives and associated metrics and indicators always involves subjectivity.²⁰ That said, mindful of its central role within this policy field, the obvious place to start would seem to be an examination of law enforcement. This is particularly so because of the symbiotic and reinforcing relationship between objectives and indicators and the potential for them to generate perverse incentives that may, in some circumstances, encourage a range of abuses.²¹ As already discussed by the International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC), a refocusing of law enforcement could involve developing, or refining, a range of indicators that focus on the outcomes of law enforcement operations and the shape of drug markets, drug related crime, contributions to health and social

programmes and evaluation of environment and patterns of drug use and dependence.²² As an initial foray into the issue area, these are certainly useful organising headings and worthy of further attention. However, when unpacked they reveal the complexity of the challenge of developing new metrics.²³ For instance, some of the variables are more appropriate to jurisdictions within the 'global north'.²⁴ There is a differential resonance of metrics in different countries – this is not a one size fits all environment. Furthermore, they reveal that - while a central concern - a recalibration of indicators goes well beyond the law enforcement domain. It includes more holistic, and admittedly nebulous, issues of 'wellbeing', 'quality of life', and particularly but not exclusively in the case of traditional producer states, 'human development'²⁵ and 'human and citizen security.'²⁶ As such, at the multilateral level at least, there would arguably be much to gain from developing a set of new overarching high order indicators relating to revised objectives that are framed within the terms of the core purpose and principles of the UN itself: security, development and human rights. These might, as the IDPC has also suggested, cover the following domains and possible issues of concern within them, many of which incorporate a law enforcement component.

Public health, harm reduction and well-being: reductions in drug related deaths, including overdose fatalities, increased coverage and quality of harm reduction and drug treatment services and a related reduction incidence of HIV, hepatitis and tuberculosis.

Essential medicines: measures of the increased availability of controlled medicines for medical and scientific purposes – especially for pain and palliative care in low and middle-income countries

Human Security; improvements in citizen security and a commensurate reduction in violence, crime and corruption resulting from the illicit drug market and from counterproductive policy responses

Development: improvements in social and economic development in areas of drug production, increased provision of equitable and environmentally sustainable development programmes

Human Rights: reductions in human rights violations and abuses against affected populations and comprehensive access to health, social and legal protections with adequate access to justice and legal aid for victims of human rights abuses.²⁷

With such a proposal comes the obvious question, how do we go about data capture? To start with, although uneven across jurisdictions, some of the required data are already collected. In the health sector, much of information is covered in data fed to the UNODC by member states via Annual Report Questionnaires (ARQs) , and included with varying degrees of confidence within the WDR, such as 'health consequences'. Other data are also collected by other UN agencies like UNAIDS and WHO.

Moreover, and cognizant of their shortcomings, it might be worth exploring the possibility of 'mining' and realigning appropriate domains from national composite indexes both within and currently beyond the drugs sphere.²⁸ Similarly, and again aware of the pitfalls of their formulation there is probably utility in exploring a range of non-drug specific indices that capture domains which, in various ways, relate to the impact of drug policy in a more holistic sense.²⁹ Examples here include indices on corruption perception, wellbeing³⁰ and human rights. Indeed, in terms of building upon existing information and expertise, the work of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in developing Human Rights indicators must not be overlooked. Within any shift in the focus of metrics, it is vital to establish robust and effective human rights monitoring mechanisms to ensure compliance by governments and law enforcement agencies.³¹ Perhaps most worthy of examination in this regard, however, is the UNDP's Human Development Index (HDI), Human Development Data and the associated Human Development Reports.³² This is particularly interesting in light of the UNDP's recent regional publication on Citizen Security in Latin America .³³

The key point here is that we are not starting from scratch. That said, an imaginative approach to corral and utilize existing data sets, both quantitative and qualitative, will certainly be required. Furthermore, while this is the case, there is no escaping the need for the creation of new data capture mechanisms. This will be a considerable challenge in a number of domains, including measuring drug related corruption and the reach and influence of transnational organised crime groups.

Opportunities at the UNGASS

Amidst growing discussions around metrics, many aspects of which have been touched upon here, the forthcoming UNGASS in April 2016 offers an ideal opportunity to move discussions forward and systematise within the UN the process of developing a basket of drug policy objectives and sophisticated indicators that are appropriate for not only a contemporary understanding of drug markets and associated harm, but that are also more in tune with developments taking place within some member states. This should engage with the expertise present within the UNODC and build upon the welcome refinement of its approach to measuring the illicit market, including the revision of mechanisms feeding into the WDR such as the ARQs. Broadening the current narrow indicators favoured at the multilateral level to incorporate health, development and security outcomes would help facilitate the further implementation of more effective drug control policies and interventions at local, national, regional and international levels and break the current metrics trap. Moreover, inclusion within the process of proficiency and data sets within UN agencies in addition to the UNODC, including UNAIDS, WHO and UNDP, would contribute to the reduction of systemic dissonance around drugs and the continuing - although declining - isolation of Vienna. This is particularly so in relation to human rights; an issue that while now rhetorically prominent, remains vague on substance and monitoring. Also in relation to system-wide coherence, linking new and carefully designed indicators to broader UN objectives and principles, would also do much to bring international drug control policy more into line with not only the UN Charter and other instruments including those concerning indigenous rights, but also contemporary UN endeavours, such as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) agreed in late 2015. Indeed, any serious discussion of the measurement of drug policy impacts within the development domain must read across to relevant SDGs indicators.³⁴

Once again, an obvious question arises. How would such a process be initiated? Mindful of the existence of expert groups at previous UNGASS's on drugs, a good way forward would be to use next year's UNGASS to establish some sort of expert technical review group on metrics and indicators.³⁵ As well as drawing on expertise from other UN agencies, this should be tasked with looking at other sectors, including security, and mechanisms within nation states for best practice. While the group's task would be complex, its goal would be straightforward: the development of new metrics and indicators to be considered for adoption at the CND's next 10 year review of progress in 2019. Its remit should also be broad enough to consider policy shifts that operate outside the confines of the extant regime framework and perhaps be part of proposed endeavours to examine wider tensions not only across the drug control conventions but also between these and other international instruments, including those relating to human rights. As ever within the UN system, the drug control regime being no exception, there will be a question of financial resources. Who pays? One would hope that member states would be willing to provide sufficient budgetary resource for such an undertaking. If not, in one way or another, we will all pay through the continuation of inappropriate, ineffective and ultimately harmful drug control policies.

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³ There is a tacit admission here that there is a need to attempt to incorporate qualitative data within evaluation processes, problematic though this may be.

⁴ Including Input, Process, Output and Outcome indicators.

⁵ See [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52013XG1130\(01\)&from=EN](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52013XG1130(01)&from=EN) The Plan includes an annex listing indicators ('Overarching indicators from the EU Action Plan on Drugs 2013-2016')

⁶ It should be noted that while the EU strategy contains a high-level objective of reducing supply, there have not been the necessary accompanying efforts to assemble data, or even a scheme, to assess if that objective is being achieved.

⁷ IDPC, TNI, SICAD, *Expert Seminar – Where next for Europe on drug policy reform?* Lisbon, Portugal, 20th to 21st June 2013 pp. 12-13. https://www.tni.org/files/download/expert_seminar_in_lisbon_final.pdf

⁸ On the demand side, this may involve problematic drug users reacting to shortages by shifting to other substances and methods of consumption. Meanwhile, on the supply side, the concepts of the balloon effect and the displacement of trafficking routes following 'successful' law enforcement and military interventions relating to forced crop eradication and interdiction are now widely accepted, if not given the attention they warrant within supposedly 'balanced' and 'integrated' counter narcotic strategies.

⁹ See https://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND/CND_Sessions/CND_52/Political-Declaration2009_V0984963_E.pdf

¹⁰ H. May, 'Twenty Years of Narcotics Control Under the United Nations – Review of the work of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs', *Bulletin on Narcotics*, 1966

¹¹ Rittel, H. J. W and Webber, M. M., (1973), 'Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning', *Policy Sciences* 4

¹² Camillus, J. (2008), 'Strategy as a Wicked Problem', *Harvard Business Review*, May

¹³ Also see MacCoun, R. J. and Reuter, P. (2001) *Drug War Heresies: Learning from Other Vices, Times and Places*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 106-7 for a taxonomy of drug related harms. The authors list 48 harms, many of which are caused by enforcement.

¹⁴ See Bewley-Taylor, D. R. (2012), *International Drug Control: Consensus Fractured*, Cambridge University Press

¹⁵ For example, as IDPC's Modernising Drug Law Enforcement initiative (<http://idpc.net/policy-advocacy/special-projects/modernising-drug-law-enforcement>) has highlighted, retail drug markets are not fundamentally violent places. In fact, violence is often related to the type of law enforcement intervention deployed. In some instances, in order to hit arrest targets and demonstrate intent, law enforcement agencies target low-level dealers. The results are far from satisfactory. The low threshold means that these 'clockers' are easily replaceable, there is limited (if any) substantive impact on organisational effectiveness or drug supply. Importantly, such an approach may also trigger turf wars and increase violence. Yet, within the current frameworks, more sophisticated policing and community approaches that aim to reduce violence without necessarily increasing arrests, it is difficult to measure 'success'. See particularly Stevens, A. (2013), *Applying harm reduction principles to the policing of retail drug markets*, Modernising Drug Law Enforcement, Report 3, IDPC.

https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/64663568/library/MDLE-report_3_applying-harm-reduction-to-policing-of-retail-markets.pdf

¹⁶ The Global Commission on Drug Policy noted in 2011 that 'The current system of measuring success in the drug policy field is flawed ... A new set of indicators is needed to truly show the outcomes of drug policies, according to their harms or benefits for individuals and communities ...' Recommendation 4 in *War on Drugs: Report of the Global Commission on Drug Policy*, June 2011, p. 13 http://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/wp-content/themes/gcdp_v1/pdf/Global_Commission_Report_English.pdf The issue also receives attention in the Commission's *Taking Control: Pathways to Drug Policies that Work*, September 2014, p. 36. Other work on the issue includes Shultze-Kraft, M. and Befani, B. (2014) *Getting high on impact: the challenge of evaluating drug policy*, Policy Brief 3, Global Drug Policy Observatory, Swansea University, UK <http://www.swansea.ac.uk/media/GDPO%20Getting%20High%20FINAL.pdf>, Muggah, R., Aguirre, K., and Szabo de Carvalho, I. (2015), *Measurement Matters: Designing New Metrics for a Drug Policy that Works*, Strategic Paper 12, Instituto Igarape, Rio de Janeiro https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/AE-12-Measurement-mattes-07h-jan_.pdf, and Werb, D et al, 'Consensus Statement: The Need to Update Drug Policy Metrics' International Centre for Science in Drug Policy, Toronto, forthcoming. For a brief discussion of political issues surrounding data at the UN level see, Hallam, C. and Bewley-Taylor, D. (2010) 'Editorial. Mapping the world drug problem: Science and politics in the United Nations drug control system', *International Journal of Drug Policy*, 21, pp. 1-2

¹⁷ Author notes, CND 2015

¹⁸ Schleifer R., et al, (2015) *Addressing the Development Dimension of Drug Policy*, United Nations Development Programme: HIV, Health and Development <http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/hiv-aids/addressing-the-development-dimensions-of-drug-policy.html>

¹⁹ In addition it is noteworthy that some police services (e.g. the Metropolitan Police Service) have in the past experimented with more sophisticated Performance Indicators around drugs. In 2001, the MPS Output Performance Target for drugs included percentage of adults referred to programmes as a result of arrest referral schemes. Correspondence with Geoff Monaghan, 26-11-2014

²⁰ See Ritter, A. (2009) 'Methods for comparing drug policies – The Utility of composite Drug Harm Indexes', *International Journal of Drug Policy* 20, pp. 475-479. Ritter notes, 'The choice of outcomes for inclusion is driven by the purpose... but also often by practical considerations, such as data availability.' Also see Howlett, M., Ramesh, M and Perl A. (2009), *Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems*, Oxford University Press, pp. 178-9

²¹ As has been noted, law enforcement strategic objectives should be moved to focus on the consequences – positive or negative – of the drug market, rather than its scale. IDPC, *Drug Policy Guide*, Edition 2, March 2012, p. 34
https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/64663568/library/IDPC-Drug-Policy-Guide_2nd-Edition.pdf

²² IDPC, *Drug Policy Guide*, Edition 2, March 2012, p. 34 https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/64663568/library/IDPC-Drug-Policy-Guide_2nd-Edition.pdf

²³ For example in relation to organised crime, the power and reach of criminal groups includes money laundering. But other issues that could be considered include - poverty, social marginalisation, public distrust of law enforcement, environmental damage, loss of civil liberties, family break-up and racial disparities.

²⁴ For instance, within the 'global south' consideration must be made for law enforcement engagement with small-scale subsistence farmers growing crops declared illicit as well as populations displaced due to crop eradication and drug related violence (on the latter, Ciudad Juárez in Mexico is a good-bad example. Also of note here is the influence of drug related corruption in Afghanistan. See Bewley-Taylor, D (2013) 'Drug Trafficking and Organised Crime in Afghanistan: Corruption, Insecurity and the Challenges of Transition', *The RUSI Journal*, December, Vol. 158 No. 6 pp. 6-17 and Felbab-Brown, V. (2013), *Focused Deterrence, Selective Targeting, Drug Trafficking and Organised Crime*, Modernising Drug Law Enforcement, Report 2, IDPC. As Felbab-Brown notes, not all organisations and leaders are equally as powerful and consequently capable of corruption. As such there is a need to target and reduce corruption, but also measure success against their most pernicious forms. Moreover, in a country like Afghanistan, there is a need to measure improvements in governance as well as development and security.

²⁵ On the UN drug control apparatus and human development see IDPC Advocacy Note (2014), *UNODC's shifting position on drug policy: Progress and challenges*, p. 3, regarding the 'Contribution of the Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to the high level review of the implementation of the Political Declaration and Plan of Action on International Cooperation towards an Integrated and Balance Strategy to Counter the World Drug Problem'. As is noted, this is vague on 'the implications of comprehensive, sustainable alternative development programmes. These would require new ways of measuring success – focusing not on eradication activities, but more on impact and human development indicators. As pointed out in previous UNODC documents, these would include "improvements in education, health, employment, the environment, gender-related issues, institution building and government capacity"'. https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/64663568/library/IDPC-Advocacy-Note_UNODC-contributions-HLS.pdf

²⁶ Human Security can be defined as freedom from fear and freedom from want and include seven threats: economic, security, food security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security. See *Afghanistan National Human Development Report 2004. Security with a Human Face: Challenges and Responsibilities*, (UNDP) Afghanistan and Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, p.6

²⁷ These proposed domains are based on ideas in IDPC (2015), *The Road to UNGASS 2016: Process and Policy Asks from the IDPC*, https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/64663568/library/UNGASS-asks_External_04-2015_ENGLISH.pdf

²⁸ On indexes see Roberts, M, Trace, M. and Bewley-Taylor, D. (2006), *Monitoring Drug Policy Outcomes: The Measurement of Drug-related Harm*, Report 9, The Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme, Report 9, July 2006, http://www.beckleyfoundation.org/pdf/Report_09.pdf

At the national level, these might include data and/or mechanisms from the UK Drug Harm Index, the Australian Federal Police Drug Harm Index and the New Zealand Drug Harm Index. The UK DHI, for example, captured data to in relation to (i) drug related domestic and commercial crime (ii) community problems (iii) health harms.

²⁹ See Crick, E (2011), *Drugs and well-being: Prohibition's negative impacts*, in Julia Buxton (Ed.), *The Politics of Narcotic Drugs: A Survey*, London & New York: Routledge, pp. 150-155. Key themes are 'health, security (both economic and physical), and the ability to engage on social and political levels. Including concepts of 'satisfaction' and 'happiness'

³⁰ Other indexes to consider might be Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index and data sets within Foreign Affairs Fragile States Index. In terms of well-being these could include data from the Index of Economic wellbeing (IEWB), Weighted Index of Social Progress (WISP), Economist Intelligence Unit's (EIU) Quality of Life Index.

³¹ On this see United Nations Human Rights Office of the high Commissioner, (2012) *Human Rights Indicators: A Guide to Measurement and Implementation*, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Human_rights_indicators_en.pdf

³² These include data on social integration, health and a multidimensional poverty index <http://hdr.undp.org/en/data/api>

³³ United Nations Development Programme, (2013) *Citizen Security with a humane face: Evidence and proposals for Latin America*, (Executive Summary). <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/citizen-security-human-face> This was written with the assistance of the UNODC and includes reference to not only drug use, but the 'unintended consequences of the State fighting drug trafficking organizations', p. 2. The report focuses mainly on homicides and violence. Moreover, although the HDRs haven't gone into detail on 'issues related to the control of illegal drugs' it would be good to see more engagement with the issue in its future reports (Annual HDR as well as the Regional and National HDRs). That said, the UNDP is not immune from the politics often surrounding the drug issue. See 'UNDP sets record straight on drugs debate', 14 March 2013 <http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/presscenter/articles/2013/03/14/undp-sets-record-straight-on-drugs->

[debate.html](#) Helen Clark (UNDP Administrator) was apparently forced to row back on apparent criticism of US drug policy in Latin America when speaking about the impact of trafficking in Latin America at launch of HDR 2013, *Rise of the South*.

³⁴ See <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/?menu=1300> A simple mapping exercise reveals a number of obvious intersection between drug policy objectives and indicators and the SDGs. For example:

SDG 1 – END POVERTY IN ALL ITS FORMS EVERYWHERE. In areas of concentrated drug production, trafficking and consumption, drug control objectives that currently focus on reducing the scale – ultimately to the point of elimination - of the market at all costs could be replaced by an approach that seeks an improvement in the established social and economic development indicators. This could be evaluated via links to the United Nations Development Programme’s Human Development Index, (HDI) notably its Multidimensional Poverty Index, and the data used for the production of the annual Human Development Reports

SDG 2 – END HUNGER, ACHIEVE FOOD SECURITY AND IMPROVED NUTRITION AND PROMOTE SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE. With its strong links to SDG 1, while there are a number of specific targets of relevance, drug control efforts could have an impact in relation to a number of areas:

- 2.3, 2.4 & 2.5 - Within traditional producer states, improvements in agricultural productivity, sustainable food production and investment in rural infrastructure are all factors that should be embedded within alternative development programmes that themselves need to be integrated within comprehensive and long-term development strategies. Once again, the HDI and selected associated data sets could be used to evaluate policy outcomes.

SDG 3 – ENSURE HEALTHY LIVES AND PROMOTE WELLBEING FOR ALL AT ALL AGES. There are four aspects of the ‘health’ SDG that drug control could contribute significantly to:

- 3.3 – Reduce new HIV and AIDS infections attributed to injecting drug use. This objective, and the means for measuring progress, already exists within the UNAIDS system, and will be reiterated at the AIDS UNGASS later in 2016.

- 3.4 – Reduce drug related deaths. Systems for the measurement of causes of death are well established within the World Health Organization and national reporting systems.

- 3.5. – Expand prevention and treatment. This objective, while more process than outcome, is already bedded into the SDG system. A related outcome objective would be to reduce the number of addicted, or problematic, drug users.

- 3.8. Improve access to essential medicines. It is increasingly recognized that the current international drug control system hinders access, especially in relation to opioid analgesics. Although currently falling outside the three pillars laid out in the 2009 Political Declaration, data on access to essential medicines is collected and collated by the International Narcotics Control Board and could be used to evaluate the impact of drug policy on progress towards this SDG target.

SDG 16 – PROMOTE PEACEFUL AND INCLUSIVE SOCIETIES. There are two aspects of the ‘security’ SDG to which drug control could significantly contribute:

- 16.1. Reduce homicides associated with the illicit drug market. Some countries are already prioritizing reductions in violence as the objective of drug law enforcement.

- 16.5. Reduce corruption and bribery associated with illicit drug market. A potential objective is the reduction of the power and reach of organised crime, which could be measured through estimates of the profits accumulated by organised crime groups through drug trafficking.

As a cursory examination of the SDGs reveals, the cross-cutting nature of the issue area ensures that in addition to those discussed above, a number other of Goals intersect with drug policy, including Goal 5 (Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls), Goal 8, (Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all), and Goal 15 (Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss) and Goal 16 (Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels).

³⁵ See Jelsma, M. (2015), ‘UNGASS 2016: Prospects for Treaty Reform and UN System-Wide Coherence on Drug Policy,’ Brookings Institute, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence Latin American Initiative <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Research/Files/Papers/2015/04/global-drug-policy/Jelsma--United-Nations-final.pdf?la=en>, Transnational Institute, (2015) UNGASS 2016. *Background memo on the proposal to establish an expert advisory group*, Memo <http://www.undrugcontrol.info/en/un-drug-control/ungass/item/6638-ungass-2016-background-memo-on-the-proposal-to-establish-an-expert-advisory-group> and Cockayne, J. and Walker, S. (2015), *What Comes After the War on Drugs - Flexibility, Fragmentation or Principled Pluralism? Strengthening global drug policy at the 2016 United Nations General Assembly Special Session on the World Drug Problem*, United Nations University, pp. 30-36 <http://un.org.au/2015/11/04/what-comes-after-the-war-on-drugs-flexibility-fragmentation-or-principled-pluralism/>